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BARGAINING TOGETHER IN CANCUN: 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR EVOLVING COALITIONS 
ABSTRACt 
In large measure, the voice that developing countries were able to exercise in Cancun was a 
result of their effective coalition formation. In this paper we present a brief overview of the 
various coalitions that played an important role at Cancun. The greater part of this paper 
focuses on one among these various coalitions: the G22 on agriculture. The G22 presents an 
especially fascinating case of a coalition that combined a great diversity of members and 
apparently incompatible interests. All theoretical reasoning and historical precedent 
predicted that the group would collapse in the endgame. And yet the group survived. We 
investigate the sources of the unity of this group and trace them to a process of learning that 
allowed the group to acquire certain structural features and develop strategies that helped to 
cement it further. While our central dependent variable is the cohesion of the G22, we also 
address the derivative question of the costs and benefits of maintaining such coalitions. The 
Cancun coalitions give us an excellent case of coalitions that managed to retain their 
cohesion, but also ended up with a situation of no agreement rather than a fulfillment of 
even some of their demands. We examine some of the causes behind the impasse in the 
negotiation process and propose alternative negotiating strategies that the G22 could have 
used to improve the outcome. 
KEY WORDS: coalitions, developing countries, negotiating strategies, learning, 'WTO, 
Cancun Ministerial. 
Reactions to the collapse at Cancun as well as targets in the blame game have been mixed. 
But irrespective of these differences, most observers agree that the role that developing 
countries played at Cancun was unfamiliar and innovative.In good measure, the voice that 
developing countries were able to exercise in Cancun was a of their effective coalition 
formation. Not only did developing countries use these coalitions for an exchange of 
information and discussion, but they were able to adhere to their joint positions in the 
endgame. Further, despite the differences in the agenda of different coalitions, a successful 
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effort was made to coordinate their positions so that they did not enter into direct conflict 
with each other. Particularly against the backdrop of some of the problems that developing 
countries have historically encountered in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
predecessor institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), these are no 
mean achievements. 
In this paper, we address the question: How did developing country coalitions at Cancun 
manage to preserve such high levels of cohesion, when many other such coalitions in the 
past had failed? We argue that the answer lies in some of the structural features of the 
coalitions. But many of these structural characteristics derive from the previous experience 
of developing countries with coalitions as well as the negotiation process, and suggest a 
process of social learning. Empirically, while we devote some attention to the interplay 
between coalitions, our main focus in this paper is the so-called G22 on agriculture. In 
Section 1, we present a map of the various coalitions that were in operation at Cancun. We 
further explain our reasons for focusing on the G22 and present a brief account of its 
formation, membership and agenda. In section 2, we discuss some of the theoretical writings 
on the subject of bargaining coalitions to illustrate the problems of coalition formation and 
maintenance. In section 3, we draw upon the historical record of coalitions in the GATT & 
to suggest that the G22 is a product of almost two decades of learning by developing 
countries. On the basis of our theoretical and historical analysis, we are able to highlight 
certain features of the G22 that facilitated intra-group cohesion, as well as the impact of 
external conditions, in section 4. While our central dependent variable is the cohesion of 
these coalitions, we also address the derivative question of the costs and benefits of 
maintaining such coalitions. The Cancun coalitions give us an excellent case of coalitions 
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that managed to retain their cohesion, but also ended up with a situation of no agreement 
rather than a fulfillment of even some of their demands. As such, even though the efforts of 
the G22 and other coalitions were unprecedented and commendable in preserving the unity 
of the coalition until the very end of the conference, we cannot deem these coalitions as 
outright successes. In the fifth and concluding section, we discuss alternative negotiating 
strategies that the G22 and its cousins could have used, which may have helped in 
overcoming the impasse that was reached at Cancun. 
1. Coalitions at Cancun 
In the preparatory process leading up to the Cancun Ministerial, developing countries 
engaged in several joint initiatives that involved an exchange of information as well as the 
formulation of joint proposals. Many of these already had a history in the preparations for 
the Doha Ministerial in 2001, if not earlier. Examples of these included the African Group, 
the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group, the Group of Least Developed Countries 
(LDQ, the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVE), and the Like Minded Group (LMG). 
None of these coalitions were issue-specific; rather, they were blocs that adapted their 
agenda according to the pressing needs of the day.1 However, if we were to seek some of the 
key issues that these groups have been associated with, the first four of these groups have 
had at least some overlapping membership and have shared some similar concerns about 
Special and Differential treatment (S&D) and the erosion of preferences as a result of 
more on the typology of coalitions and an empirical analysis of coalitions until the Doha Ministerial, Narlikar (2003). 
Note that there were several issue-specific coalitions also in play in the run-up to Cancun, including some that continued 
from Doha, e.g. on Geographical Indications and Mode 4. But towards the endganie, partly as a result of the way the 
conference had evolved, the major coalition players from the developing world seem to have been the ACP, African 
Group, SVE, LMG, Core Group, the coalition on cotton , the alliance on Strategic Products & Special Safeguard 
Mechanism and the G22. 
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liberalization. The LMG, which came to comprise 14 countries by the time of the Doha 
Ministerial, pushed for the so-called "implementation issues", development issues, and 
systemic reform, and opposed the inclusion of the Singapore issues.2 
All these coalitions had had varying degrees of success in getting their issues onto the Doha 
Development Agenda. The AGP had managed to get an extension of the 'WfO waiver for 
trade preferences from the EU under the Cotonou Agreement. This counted as a success for 
the African Group as well, although the agenda of the group had also covered several other 
issue-areas. Paragraphs 42 and 43 of the main Doha Declaration, even though comprising 
largely promises and good intentions, are devoted exclusively to the concerns of the LDCs. 
Paragraph 35 recognized the concerns of the SVEs. References to S&D are dotted 
throughout the text and appear specifically in Paragraph 42. And as per the agenda of the 
LMG, promises to address their implementation concerns appear in Paragraph 12 of the 
main Declaration and are discussed in detail in the "Decision on Implementation-Related 
Issues and Concerns." 
Having managed to get at least some of their concerns onto the Doha Development 
Agenda, these five coalitions continued to meet in the two years between Doha and Cancun 
to ensure that the promises of the Doha Development Agenda would be kept in the new 
round. But as the Cancun Ministerial approached, many developing countries became aware 
that some of their key concerns risked being sidelined, especially in the possible event of the 
US and the EU colluding on several issues, especially agriculture. In a series of interviews 
2Narlilcar and Odell (2003). The Singapore issues refer to competition policy, government procurement, trade facilitation 
and investment. The LMG comprises Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, with Jamaica and Mauritius as observers. 
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that we conducted with delegates from developing countries in May 2003, several of our 
interviewees repeatedly expressed the fear of the EU and the US "puliing another Blair 
House Accord on us."3 As a result, in the summer leading up to Cancun, several new 
coalitions swung into action. Among these were the Core Group of developing countries 
resisting the Singapore issues, the coalition on cotton, the coalition on Strategic Products 
and Special Safeguard Mechanism, and the G22 on agriculture. 
The Core Group of developing countries initially comprised 16 members: Bangladesh, Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Venezuela, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. In response to a paper by the EU which had assumed that the negotiation on 
Singapore issues would commence after Cancun, the Core group submitted a joint statement 
in July. The text stated that "Explicit consensus on the modalities is required for negotiations 
to commence not consensus on how to classify and group the different procedural and 
structural aspects of the Singapore issues."4 The group also proposed that the four Singapore 
issues should not be grouped into a single basket. It further cited the fact that the African 
Group and the LDC group had adopted positions similar to the Core Group's in meetings at 
Dhaka and Grand Baie respectively. Members of the group continued to work jointly in 
Cancun, and attracted many new recruits. A letter by the group addressed to Minister Pierre 
Pettigrew, Facilitator for the Singapore issues at Cancun, dated 12 September 2003, had 29 
signatories (with Bangladesh signing on behalf of the LDCs).5 On the final day of the 
conference, the African group, and LDC and ACP groups (and members of the SVE which 
Interviews with representatives of developing countries to the W1'O, May 2003. 
Comments on the EC Communication (WT/GC/W/491) on the Modalities for the Singapore Issues, 
WT/GC/W/501, 8 July 2003; original emphasis retained in the quote. 
Available at http://www.ictsd.org/ministeriallcancunldocuments_and_links.htm. 
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also belonged to at least one of these three coalitions), working together, took a similar 
position. On the final day of the Gancun conference, the Singapore issues emerged as the 
real deal-breaker. Botswana, speaking on behalf of the AU, announced that they could not 
agree to any deal that included even one of the Singapore issues. South Korea retaliated by 
stating that it could not accept a deal without all four Singapore issues. Hence, even though 
countries had shown major differences over different issues throughout the conference, the 
intractability of the Singapore issues provided the immediate cause for the Chairman of the 
Conference, Luis Emesto Derbez, to finally throw in the trowel. 
Another coalition that came into play in the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial was the group 
of four West and Central African countries (Mali, Benin, Chad and Burkina Faso) that 
proposed a complete phase-out of subsidies on cotton and financial compensation for the 
LDCs until the subsidies were phased out.6 Also in the run-up to Cancun was the Alliance 
on Strategic Products (SP) and Special Safeguard Mechanism Reports about coalition 
activity among 16 countries over this proposal go back to at least late July.7 At the beginning 
of the conference, the coalition comprised 23 members including Barbados, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ecuador. The group, particularly under the leadership of Indonesia 
and Philippines, proposed that developing countries be allowed to self-designate certain 
strategic products that would not be subject to tariff reductions or new commitments. A 
special safeguard mechanism would be established to protect the domestic markets of 
6 TN/AG/GEN/4, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favor of Cotton, 16 May2003. 
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 7, No. 27, 28 July 2003, available at www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-07- 
28/story4.htm. 
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developing countries against import surges. By 13 September, this coalition had expanded to 
33 members.8 Both the coalitions on cotton and on SP/SSM were a response of developing 
countries to the fact that developed countries had, so far, shown few signs of improving 
market access while S&D provisions were proving highly inadequate. Developing countries 
would have to act in concert to somehow get these issues onto the negotiating table, often 
with the help of original and creative proposals. 
The fourth coalition that emerged in the process leading up to Cancun was the G22. The 
origins of this coalition can be traced to the Brasilia Declaration signed between Brazil, India 
and South Africa in June The coalition materialized as such in response to the EU-US 
text on agriculture (even though cooperation among some of the G22 has precedents in the 
both trade and other issues). Until the EU-US text came out on August 13, according to one 
member, Cairns Group members had hoped that the US would support their position.1° 
Similarly, countries with a more defensive interest in agriculture had hoped that the EU 
would back their positions. Developing countries from both sets of interests came together 
when they realized that the EU and the US had joined forces and come up with a text that 
highly unsatisfactory. Explaining the rationale behind the coalition, Minister Amorim of 
Brazil who was also coordinator for the G22 wrote: 
"The real dilemma that many of us had to face was whether it was sensible to accept an 
agreement that would essentially consolidate the policies of the two subsidizing superpowers 
8 Bridges Daily Update, ICTSD, 13 September 2003, Issue 4. 
www.southasiamonitor.org/dip1omacy/2003/sep/26dip7.htm1 
10 The &ims Group comprises Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
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- with very modest gains and even some steps backward (the new broader definition of 'blue 
box' subsidies to accommodate the US for instance) -- and then have to wait for another 15 
or 18 years to launch a new round, after having spent precious bargaining chips."11 
Brazil and India drafted the first text together, and then collaborated with other countries 
who also became members of the group. With China aboard, the group became one that 
combined (arguably) all the emerging powers from the developing world. The alternative 
framework proposal put forth by the group, dated 2 September, was signed by 20 countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. With the addition of Egypt and Kenya, the group acquired the name of the G22. 
The coalition went beyond being a simple blocking coalition, but one with a proactive and 
positive agenda. It proposed more radical cuts on domestic support measures provided by 
developed countries (than the EU-US draft had proposed), including a capping or a 
reduction on domestic support measures used by the developed countries in the Green Box. 
On market access, the coalition proposed a blended formula under which "each element will 
contribute to substantial improvement in market access for all products, in an effective and 
measurable way."12 Here too, it sought greater commitment from developed countries, e.g. 
"All developed countries shall provide access to all tropical products and others 
mentioned in the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture as well as to other agricultural 
products representing at least []% of imports from developing countries."13 It called for the 
11 Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2003. 
12 Paragraph 2.1, WT/MIN(03)/W/6. 
13 Paragraph 2.5, Ibid. 
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discontinuation of the Special Agricultural Safeguard for developed countries and supported 
the establishment of a special safeguaitl mechanism for developing countries. On export 
subsidies, the G22 proposed the elimination "over a [x] year period" of export subsidies for 
the products of particular interest to developing countries, and further that "Members shall 
commit to eliminate over a [y] year period export subsidies for the remaining products."14 
References to S&D appeared in all three areas of domestic support, market access and 
export subsidies. Even though all the proposals on agriculture were framework proposals at 
this stage (rather than tabling exact figures), the G22 framework required the developed 
countries to commit to significantly higher levels of liberalization than the EU-US proposal 
had envisaged. 
All the coalitions discussed so far played important roles independently in different phases 
of the Cancun process. Just as important was the role that they played together. A careful 
effort was made to maintain coordination between groups, and at least prevent outright 
opposition when support for the other's position was not possible. Hence, for instance, 
members of the G22 expressed support for the Alliance on SP and SSM. Consultation and 
coordination between the ACP, African Group, the G22 and the Alliance on SP and 
SSM continued into the penultimate day of the conference when the Chair produced a 
second draft. The African Group, LDC and ACP groups similarly coordinated their 
positions to become the G90 on the final day of the conference. Among all the cases 
discussed so far, however, the G22 in particular demands attention. 
Paragraph 3.1, Ibid. 
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The G22 was a new actor in the negotiations. Its appearance was momentous, especially as it 
was the first coalition in which China played a leading and committed role since it became a 
member of the 'WTO. In its resistance against the EU and the US, it captured a great deal of 
public attention. It presented a new exemplar of the proactive diplomacy of the emerging 
powers, especially with Brazil, China and India at its helm. The coalition constituted a major 
weight in economic terms, especially as it contained 69% of the world's farmers. As such, it 
presented a credible threat to block consensus. It also possessed some moral weight, which it 
exeitised to its great credit, by emphasizing that it represented the interests of over half of 
the world's population. Unlike some of the older coalitions involving developing countries, 
the G22 did not have a blocking agenda but a proactive one, which was typified in its 
technically substantive proposal. Irrespective of the final machinations on the last day when 
the Singapore issues emerged as the deal-breaker, agriculture had in fact been the bate noir 
through most of the conference. To use a counterfactual, even if the Singapore issues had 
been resolved on the last day, consensus would still have been unlikely due to the G22's 
dissatisfaction with the various drafts that still made minimal commitments on agriculture. 
Here was a coalition that was capable of making a difference, through the logic of its 
argument but also the sheer strength of its weight. 
For analysts of coalitions and trade negotiations, the G22 presents a fascinating puzzle. The 
G22 is important to us, not simply because it comprised such a major mass of the 
developing world, but because it brought together some extremely unlikely candidates. The 
biggest potential fault-line within the group was between the Cairns Group exporters and 
the defensive food importers. It combined some of the largest and most powerful members 
of the developing world with some of the smallest. Observers and several of our 
12 
interviewees (from international organizations and non-member countries) repeatedly 
predicted the likely collapse of the group, particularly in the endgame when the Quad would 
wield bilateral carrots and sticks on the group. The LMG at Doha had akeady lived through 
such a fate of fragmentation in the endgame;15 the G22 potentially had even more serious 
sources of fracture. And yet, the group survived. 
2. Problems of Coalition Formation and Maintenance: The Theory 
'While theoretical writings on the subject of inter-state bargaining coalitions are few, a diverse 
body of literature (including negotiation analysis, theories of International Relations and 
International Political points to two central problems that coalitions of 
developing countries encounter: minimal external weight and the risk of fragmentation.'6 
The first problem is an inevitable result of the smaller shares of developing countries in the 
world economy. The vulnerability of a coalition to the second problem depends on several 
factors including the structure of the coalition, the interests that coalesce, its negotiating 
and the response it generates from other parties. 
Coalitions unable to overcome the first problem risk marginalization in the endgame, partly 
because they may find it harder to block consensus in the face of pressure from their more 
powerful counterparts.'7 But this structural constraint can be overcome in several ways. 
First, the coalition can be re-constituted so that it includes some larger economies, e.g. the 
Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round.'8 Second, the coalition of small and weak countries 
15 Narlikar and Odd (2003). 
16 Hamilton and 'Whalley (1989), Kahier and Odell (1989), Narlikar and Odell (2003), Tussie and Glover (1995), 
Narlikar (2003). 
17 Theories of coalitions at the domestic level raise the issue of size in some depth, e.g. Riker (1962), Gamson 
(1964), Hlncldey (1979), Frohlich et al (1971). Some theories of IPE also focus on the coalition size and the 
bearing that domestic institutions have on facilitating mass movements (e.g. Alt et al, 1996). 
18 Tussie (1995), Hlggot and Cooper (1990). 
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can improve its bargaining strength by relying on larger numbers. Large numbers may help 
enhance the collective market size of the coalition and also the legitimacy of its agenda. But 
most important, in the endgame, countries find it easier to refuse a sub-optimal deal if they 
are not isolated in their resistance. When the ACP, LDC and African Group came together 
in the endgame at Cancun to constitute the G90, they illustrated an effective use of this 
strategy. Third, even if coalitions comprise some of the weakest countries, they can still 
exercise a powerful influence in the negotiations by conducting detailed research on the 
subject and thereby finding a niche in the negotiation. Most of the recent coalitions 
involving developing countries, e.g. at Doha and Cancun, have in fact involved considerable 
commitment to research and information-sharing. 
The second problem that coalitions encounter, the risk of fragmentation, has several causes. 
Irrespective of the causes, however, the effect of fragmentation is the same. As soon as it 
becomes evident that one country is defecting from a coalition, the fear of other members of 
being isolated in the endgame increases. A dominoes effect ensues.19 
While all coalitions risk fragmentation, some are more prone to it than others. Coalitions of 
the weak, by definition, run this risk because the ability of developing countries to withstand 
pressure is lower than that of developed countries.20 Coalitions that combine differing 
priorities of member countries, by their very structure, are easier to fragment, especially if 
selectively targeted, bilateral carrots and sticks are used against some members to prompt 
19 Narlikar and Odell (2003). on a typologyof negotiating strategies and constituent tactics, see Odell (2000). 
20 Developing on Rousseau's idea of the 'Stag Hunt', Robert Jervis (1978) wrote "If the failure to eat that day— 
be it venison or rabbit - means that he will starve, a person is likely to defect in the Stag Hunt even if he really 
likes venison and has a high level of trust in his colleagues. (Defection is especially likely if the others are also 
starving or they know that he is.)" Coalitions of the weak run a similar risk 
14 
defection. As a result, bloc-type coalitions that address a diversity of issues are vulnerable to 
this risk Such coalitions are often maintained through logrolling of a wide variety of 
interests, and prove friable when outsiders offer to address the particular priorities of certain 
members either bilaterally or in other groups. The G- 10 in the Uruguay Round typified these 
problems (to be discussed in the next section).2' 
The susceptibility to fragmentation also depends on the type of negotiating strategy that the 
coalition uses. Coalitions of developing countries that use a distributive strategy, i.e. claim 
value from the other side and offer no concessions in return throughout the negotiating 
process, tend to attract divide-and-rule tactics from the opposing parties. Rather than give in 
to the high demands placed by the coalition, the opposing parties choose the cheaper 
alternative of offering bilateral deals to the members of the coalition. Should some members 
accept these deals, a dominoes effect is like to ensue leading to the collapse of the coalition. 
This undermines the credibility of the coalition and results in sub-optimal gains or even 
losses for the isolated members who continue to adhere to that collective position in the 
endgame.22 Especially if the coalition has a strong leadership (e.g. India in the case of the 
LMG), and if bilateral deals improve in the face of a collective distributive strategy, the 
coalition will come under even greater risk of fragmentation due to free-riding. Smaller 
members would be tempted to defect, especially if the leaders are likely to carry the flag of 
the coalition anyway. 
21 Kumar (1995), Narlikar (2003). 
22 Of course if the coalition is able to withstand these pressures and makes a credible threat to block, then the 
results are either very high gains or no agreement (we saw the latter result at Cancun). On the use of the 
distributive negotiating strategies, see Narlikar and Odell (2003). 
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Assuming that the use of a distributive strategy increases the risks of defection by members 
in favor of bilateral deals, the obvious solution would seem to be the use of a mixed 
So for instance, the coalition could start out by making high demands, but could then display 
some flexibility in the later stages of the negotiation by engaging in some reciprocal 
exchange and value creation. But here, the problem of coalition structure kicks in again. 
Writing specifically about issue-specific coalitions, Hamilton and Whalley argue, "And since 
countries typically wish to balance their positions cross all the issues that are of interest to 
them, they need to reserve some degree of flexibility to allow for changes in position on 
various issues as part of the negotiating processes. Such changes may well be inconsistent 
with agreements that countries have entered into in order to join the coalition. These 
coalitions are, therefore, very difficult to maintain. They tend to be more resilient where the 
issue at stake is of major importance to all the members of the coalition (such as agriculture 
for most of the Cairns Group members). In fact, the same argument can be made about 
bloc-type coalitions that cover different issue-areas. It becomes almost impossible for the 
coalition to show any flexibility on any of its demands, because every issue on its logrolled 
agenda is of importance to at least one of its members.23 Due to scarcity of resources, some 
delegates and officials from international organizations pointed out to us in interviews that it 
is difficult enough for developing countries to arrive at one common position, let alone a 
joint faliback position. 
Except from the problem of minimal economic weight, the G22 potentially suffered from all 
the problems outlined in the previous paragraphs. First, it combined a vast mix of 
developing countries, including small countries whose susceptibility to bilateral arm-twisting 
23 Narlikar and Odell (2003). 
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was high and the ability to hold out against such pressures iow. Second, even while focusing 
on the issue-area of agriculture, it brought together countries with divergent positions on the 
issue of agricultural liberalization vs. protectionism, let alone differing preference hierarchies 
in relation to other issues. Third, it used a strictly distributive strategy It demanded 
concessions from the Quad and offered very little in return. All these features suggest a 
vulnerability of the group to a very high risk of fragmentation. The fact that the coalition 
stood united through Cancun, and continues to meet to the present day, demands 
explanation. 
3. The Practice of Coalition-Building: Social Learning? 
The G22 survives in the face of theoretical insights to the contrary, and in spite of a history 
of coalitions of developing countries that have collapsed. A large part of the explanation for 
this survival lies in the fact that the G22 builds on at least two decades of coalition 
formations behind it. From the experiments with different coalition types, developing 
countries have now evolved a new coalition type. 
Coalitions, over the past two decades, may be classified into two types: bloc-type coalitions 
and issue-based alliances. The two may be seen as representing the opposite ends of a 
spectrum. There are two key differences between the bloc-type coalitions and issue-based 
alliances. First, the former come together against a backdrop of ideational and 
related factors, whereas the latter are formed for instrumental reasons. Second, the bloc-type 
coalitions combine like minded states and try to adopt collective positions across issue areas 
and over time; in contrast, issue-based coalitions are directed towards specific threats and 
17 
dissipate after the particular issue has been addressed.24 While bloc-type coalitions 
dominated Third World diplomacy until the early 1980s, issue-based coalitions came into 
vogue in the Uruguay Round (partly as a reaction to the failures of bloc-type 
The coalitions of today including the G22, having learnt from the failings of their 
predecessors, utilize some elements of both the bloc-type coalitions and issue-based 
alliances. 
The dialectical process of learning among coalitions may be traced back to the pre- 
negotiation phase of the Uruguay Round. The attempt by the Quad, particularly the US, to 
bring services within the purview of the GAIT catalyzed the emergence of a hard-line 
coalition of resistance, the Gb.25 The GlO had its roots in the Informal Group of 
Developing Countries. It took the position that it would block the launch of a new round 
until the older issues of standstill and rollback were attended to, and would further oppose 
the introduction of services into the GAIT. Simultaneously, a new initiative began among 
developing countries to discuss the meaning and implications of including services in the 
mandate of the GAIT. With Colombia's ambassador, Felipe Jaramillo chairing the meetings, 
the initiative was sometimes referred to as the Jaramillo process. Initially, the GlO attended 
these meetings, but the two groups soon went their separate ways. Eventually, the GlO came 
up with its own draft (which had no mention of services), and refused to even consult with 
the other developing countries that were participants in the Jaramillo process by claiming 
that their draft reflected just the views of the signatories and hence did not require 
consultation with anyone else. In response to this, members of the Jaramillo process came 
24 Narlikar (2003). 
25 The GlO in its hard line version comprised Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Nicaragua, 
Tanzania, Peru and the former Yugoslavia. 
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together as the G20.26 This group further combined with the developed countries of the G9 
and came to constitute the Café au Lait coalition (so-called as it was led by Colombia and 
Switzerland).27 The draft of the Café au Lait coalition provided the basis for the Punta del 
Este Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round.28 
The success of the Café au Lait coalition stood out against the very modest achievements of 
the Gb. In large measure, the successes of the Café au Lait coalition lay in the simplicity of 
its issue-based structure that contrasted with the log-rolling that underlay the agenda of 
traditional bloc-type groupings including the GlO. As the members of the Café au Lait 
shared a common interest over a single issue, the group enjoyed greater flexibility of 
positions and could engage with value-creating strategies rather than strictly distributive 
ones. Particularly in the Jaramillo process, the group had showed considerable commitment 
to research and information-sharing rather than grand posturing or ideology, and thereby 
came to enjoy considerable legitimacy. Further, the Café au Lait coalition was unprecedented 
in overcoming the North-South divide. While the Café au Lait opened up the path of issue- 
based diplomacy that combined developed and developing countries, the Cairns Group of 
agricultural exporting nations took it even further.29 Here was an issue-based coalition, 
acting as a mediator between the EU and the US, whose position was based on research and 
26 The members of the G20 were Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Zambia and Zaire. 
27 G9 included Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
28 Tussie and Lengyel (2002) on Café au Lait diplomacy, Narlikar (2003) for detailed case studies of some 
coalitions in the UruguayRound, including the Gb, the G20, and the Cairns Group. 
29 I-flggott and Cooper (1990), Tussie (1995). 
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analysis rather than rhetorical demands. And the very fact that agriculture was finally within 
the GATT rules was seen as evidence of the success of the issue-based coalition as a genre.3° 
The reaction of developing countries to these apparent successes of issue-based diplomacy 
was extreme. In the light of the Cafe au Lait and Cairns Group experiences, the old bloc- 
style diplomacy of the GlO stood discredited. Learning from these experiences, re- 
calculating their odds, and modifying their behavior accordingly,31 developing countries 
swung from vesting their faith in the bloc-type alliances to the "shifting coalitions" which 
focused on particular issues and combined developed and developing countries.32 But the 
euphoria with these new types of alliances as the panacea for the bargaining problems of 
developing countries proved to be short-lived. 
The few issue-based alliances that enjoyed greater visibility and sustainability were a product 
of some irreproducible circumstances. The Cairns Group, for instance, enjoyed the support 
of the US that few other coalitions have been able to attract. Most experiments with issue- 
based diplomacy displayed short lives and minimal influence. Sometimes countries would 
join different issue-based coalitions, leading to an unsustainable mix of cross-cutting and 
often contradictory loyalties. At other times, countries would simply defect to other issue- 
specific alliances. For instance, country X would soon defect from Coalition A to Coalition 
B, especially if issue B was of greater importance for country X and had been recently 
30 On a sceptical analysis of the actual victories and influence of the Cairns Group, see Narlikar (2003). 
Our account of learning fits in with the rationalist research agenda; for an analysis of different approaches, 
see Gheckel (2001). 
32 Tussie (2003). 
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introduced for negotiation. The possibility of this happening further reduced the credibility 
of these coalitions and, in turn, jeopardized the effectiveness of these coalitions further. 
Many of the coalitions of Doha and Cancun were a reaction to these pendulum swings. 
Memory of the failures of the old bloc-style diplomacy has persisted, and hence most 
delegates are quick to claim publicly that their coalitions are based not on identity or 
ideology but interests in particular issues. However, closer investigation reveals that many of 
these coalitions have also re-incorporated the key features of blocs. They are often limited to 
the developing world, outlive the issue of focus, frequently come to operate across issues, 
and are bound by a collective idea that the developing world shares several problems and 
needs to address them collectively. These "smart" coalitions hence combine elements of 
both issue-based alliances and bloc-type coalitions. Akin to the issue-based coalitions, they 
stress the importance of research in facilitating negotiations in the area under discussion. 
And like their issue-based predecessors, with whom they claim such close affinity; they may 
focus on one central issue even while addressing broader issues. By incorporating elements 
of the old bloc-style diplomacy and appealing to the shared weaknesses of developing 
countries (or some other such principle), they are able to acquire a longevity that the short- 
term "shifting coalitions" of earlier days never enjoyed. These coalitions have also adopted 
some of the research-oriented strategies of the issue-based coalitions. The resulting openness 
to other coalitions rather than an us vs. them antagonism, and logrolling that is not 
completely random but relatively more focused on a smaller set of issues (partly as a result of 
the research), makes these coalitions considerably more evolved than their bloc-type 
grandparents. Underlying these coalitions is the sense that while developing countries may 
have differing interests and need to do their homework to be effective in trade negotiations, 
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the Uruguay Round has somehow shortchanged them as a group. To correct some of the 
past imbalances and to prevent new ones from recurring, even when they focus on particular 
issue-areas, they will need to retain their bloc-type identities and also friendly relations 
among different blocs. The G22 epitomizes these smart coalitions of the third generation. 
4. Features of the G22: Explaining Intra-Group Cohesion 
It is noteworthy that even midway through the Gancun conference, delegates from 
developed countries and some international organizations indicated to us that they believed 
that the G22 was unlikely to survive in the endgame. In fact, they predicted, what would 
happen would be more along the lines of what happened at Doha: the group would cohere 
until the penultimate day of the conference at best. But it would then break along the natural 
fault-lines of exporters vs. importers, plus new lines of dissent that would emerge as a result 
of bilateral carrots and sticks that the Quad would wield against some members.33 The fact 
that this did not happen can be attributed at least partly to the structure of the group and the 
strategies that it employed. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of the G22 lay in its structure. As far as the EU and the US 
were concerned, it would be very difficult for them to ignore a coalition that constituted 
over two-thirds of the world's population, comprised over 60% of the world's farmers, and 
was led by a powerful core of emerging powers (particularly Argentina, Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa). But recall that the GlO of the Uruguay Round had also comprised a core 
group of emerging powers, and had still collapsed. The reason why the G22 was able to 
preserve its cohesion when other coalitions had failed lay in its strategies. 
Such views seemed to persist until at least as late as 12 September. 
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Key to the coherence of the G22 was the behavior of its core, and particularly Brazil, China 
and India. As per the dominoes effect that was described earlier, as long as the core group 
held together (particularly Brazil, China and India), it was highly likely that the coalition 
would endure. On the other hand, had the Big Three given any indications of differences 
among themselves, they would have prompted a chain of defections bythe smaller countries 
that could not risk commitment to a potentially divided coalition. We heard accounts of at 
least some of the smaller members of the G22 being subject to considerable pressure at 
Cancun.34 For instance, the US is reported to have offered carrots in the form of tariff 
quotas to some of the Central American countries and sticks that included the threat of 
slowing down regional integration. But the G22 held together firmly at Cancun, especially as 
the core of the group showed no sign of breaking. 
The reason why the leading members of the group were able to hold together was not 
simply a matter of obvious common interests. There was an equally high possibility that 
rather than hold together, the group would collapse along its natural fault-lines of the Cairns 
Group members and their more protectionist counterparts, the supporters of the Swiss 
formula approach for agricultural liberalization vs. the supporters of the Uruguay Round 
formula approach.35 India, with its population of about 650 million farmers with small 
holdings had a defensive interest on the issue of market access, whereas countries like Brazil 
and Argentina had a strong, offensive interest. But a compromise was arrived at preempting 
these potential rivalries, and the G22 proposed a blended formula on market access. The 
Interviews, Caricun, 9-14 September 2003. 
For a full explanation of the formulae and their implications, see www.wto.org. 
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S&D clauses on market access in the proposal, incorporating the concerns of countries with 
more protectionist interests, further stated that "there will be no commitments regarding 
TRQ expansion and reduction of in quota tariff rates for developing countries."36 In 
interviews, delegates also emphasized the extent of agreement among the members, 
particularly on the broader issue of the protectionist measures used by the EU and the US as 
the central cause for their unity.37 
In another clever move to preempt differences within the group, the G22 managed to 
incorporate the concerns of the net food-importing countries and the LDCs. Hence, even 
with its predominantly liberalizing agenda, the G22 made detailed references to S&D and 
non-trade concerns. By balancing the liberalizing interests of some of its members with the 
protectionist concerns of some of its other members and supporters outside, the G22 stood 
out in contrast to the Cairns Group with its avid and unrealistic full free trade aim in the 
Uruguay Round. 
The G22 managed to avoid antagonism not only among themselves through intra-coalition 
deals, but also maintained amicable relations with the Alliance on SP and SSM. Several 
members of the G22 were members of the Alliance on SP and SSM such as Cuba, Pakistan, 
Philippines and Venezuela. The G22 draft further proposed the establishment of Special 
Products and a Special Safeguard Mechanism (Paragraph 2.6). It also came to enjoy the 
support of the African Group in the endgame.38 As such, the G22 epitomized the smart 
36 Paragraph 2.6 (ii), W1/MIN(03)/W/6. 
Interviews, Cancun 9-14 September; Phone Interview with delegate from G22 country, 1 October 2003. 
38 Phone interview, 3 October 2003. 
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issue-based blocs of recent years, which have managed to avoid conflict with other issue- 
based alliances. 
Another strategy that contributed both to intra-group cohesion but also the external 
legitimacy of the group (at least among most countries except the EU and the US) was the 
research and careful analysis that underlay its proposal. The result of this analysis allowed the 
group to recognize their potential differences and guard against them. Further, unlike the 
blocs of the Uruguay Round, and more akin to some of the issue-based coalitions of the 
1980s and subsequent issue-based blocs of Doha,39 the G22 was not simply a laundry list of 
demands.4° As such, it was not simply a blocking coalition, but in fact a proactive agenda- 
moving one. 
So far we have focused on the and strategies of the G22 as the explanation for the 
group's cohesion and durability. However, whether these were decisive in imparting the 
strengths to the group cannot be fully gauged without considering two other explanations 
based on the strategic interaction of the group with outsiders. It is true that the group 
survived in the endgame, but the endgame at Cancun was played on a different terrain than 
agriculture. On the final day of the conference, the Singapore issues proved to be the real 
bone of contention. So to pose a counterfactual, had the Singapore issues been resolved and 
had agriculture come under discussion on the night of 14 September, would the G22 have 
still survived? It could well be argued that the crunch on agriculture never really came at 
Narlikar (2003). 
40 Note however that several attempts were made to paint the G22 as belonging to the genre of coalitions that 
make unilateral demands. For instance, Franz Fischler is reported to have said, "They never deal with other 
[countries'] concerns, and that is a problem." See Inside US Trade, www.insidetrade.com, 13 September 2003. 
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Cancun as it was simply not discussed on the last day. Another variant of this explanation is 
that there is a generalized lack of interest in trade liberalization; the US and the EU, quite 
simply, didn't care enough about launching the new and hence didn't go through 
the complicated machinations of breaking the G22. The adverse international context had 
lowered the incentives for the EU and the US to push for multilateral agreement through 
bilateral deals. After all, a climate of low growth, the US farm bill, and the withering of the 
MFN through competitive regionalization does not provide the most conducive 
environment for multilateral liberalization. Context does matter but pressures goe in several 
directions. It is worth recalling that the new round was launched at Doha on the urging of 
the developed countries and to the great resistance of developing countries (whose position 
had been that the imbalances of the Uruguay Round had to be corrected before a new round 
began). The Doha Development Agenda, does pay lip service to development concerns, but 
it remains essentially tied to the interests of the EU and the US. Admittedly, the Singapore 
issues emerged as the deal-breaker in the endgame. But the introduction of the Singapore 
issues on the last day, rather than agriculture, was a surprise by all accounts. In the run-up to 
Cancun and throughout the conference, countries had repeatedly argued that agriculture was 
the real deal-breaker. The EU and the US recognized this and we have at least some 
evidence of their attempts to break the G22 and the Alliance on SP and SSM. Various tactics 
were used: rumors and prognoses about division to precipitate the dominoes effect, bilateral 
and regional carrots and sticks at delegates' level, and calls to capitals. In other words, the 
push for the new round from the US and EU at Cancun may have been lesser than at post- 
9/11 Doha, but attempts to somehow engineer a deal suggest that the Quad had not been 
reduced to global apathy and regionalism-mania yet. It would be wrong to argue that the 
41 Garten (2003). 
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members of the G22 were not tempted or coerced to defect; rather, they held together in 
spite of it. 
The second explanation for the survival of the group goes back to the argument of the 
distributive strategy and the ability of the group to pose a credible threat. We could argue 
that even though the G22 had stuck together through the entire conference, previous 
experience of the EU and the US with such coalitions led them to doubt the credibility of 
the G22 to block This would not have been a far-fetched assumption to make. The LMG at 
Doha had shown similar promise of holding out, but had collapsed in the endgame. It would 
also explain the last-minute focus on the Singapore issues: issue-linkages would facilitate the 
collapse of the G22, which was not much of a credible threat anyway. In other words, 
misperception led the EU and the US to underestimate the seriousness of the G22 threat. 
This is perhaps a more plausible explanation to the way the events unfolded in the end and 
has interesting implications for the interaction of the EU and the US with future coalitions 
involving developing countries. The G22 has set an important precedent. It is possible that 
the EU and the US now recognize that when playing a game of Chicken with developing 
countries, the price of some developing countries is higher. To avoid another showdown the 
EU and the US may have to learn to swerve at least on certain issues and be prepared to 
make higher side-payments. 
5. Conclusions 
Assuming that the G22 would have held out even in the endgame, and in the face of 
minimal concessions that were forthcoming from the EU and the US, Cancun would have 
collapsed over agriculture if not the Singapore issues. The G22 story suggests that a 
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distributive strategy may work if the coalition is somehow able to engineer deals among its 
own members, and thereby manages to avoid defection and the associated dominoes effect. 
It is here that the G22 differed from the LMG at Doha, or the GlO in the Uruguay Round: it 
was able to maintain the unity of the coalition, even in the face of bilateral deals that were 
coming from the EU and the US. Where it failed was in establishing the credibility of its 
threat, not only because precedents suggested to the EU and the US that coalitions with 
distributive strategies have usually collapsed in the endgame. 
The question of whether the EU and the US would make concessions in the endgame, 
would of course depend on their perception of the credibility of the opposing coalition to 
block. However, equally important would be the cost of the concession, which may turn out 
to be very high if the opposing coalition is pursuing a strictly distributive strategy and refuses 
to make any concessions in return. In other words, the EU and the US may still have chosen 
the option of no agreement had agriculture appeared in the endgame and even if the G22 
had posed a credible threat. So what could be done to avoid a stalemate? 
Whether or not the G22 survives in the next few months or not is an interesting question, 
especially once the discussions at the WTO move beyond the agenda-setting stage into the 
negotiating one. But as far as agenda-moving coalitions are concerned, our analysis of the 
G22 should be relevant even if the group does not survive on a longer-term basis. Holding 
out has allowed members to exact a higher price for moving the agenda (be it multilaterally 
or bilaterally). The coalition represents a landmark and an example in the history of coalition 
formations by presenting a unified and credible threat to block To ensure that such 
coalitions can actually exeitise an influence in a resulting agreement (rather than simply 
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blocking the negotiation), the next step would be for them to adopt mixed strategies in the 
endgame. Having unified itself and presented a credible threat with a distributive strategy, 
the coalition could then adopt a value-creating strategy with much higher results than if it 
had used value-creation in the beginning of the negotiation. The use of mixed strategies can 
be problematic when different priorities in a bloc-type coalition are involved, and they do 
require even greater research inputs from the members and identification of clear bottom- 
lines and fallback positions. But it is not an impossible task, especially if the coalition 
comprises some of the most powerful members of the developing world and is sufficiently 
unified to be able to come up with alternative collective demands and concessions. 
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